The organizing idea of a federal political union needs its own institutions and forms within which this idea can take on concrete shape. If it is merely superimposed upon the existing institutions shaped according to the administrative-bureaucratic model of the European Economic Community, it cannot change their "spirit"; in that case what was practiced and rehearsed for forty years will remain dominant.
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still marked by deep political divisions, and in an era when institutional imagination seems to have dried up? Specifically, through what mechanisms could citizens exert pressure on their representatives toward federalization, assuming that is what "the European Community wants," 16 given the myriad distortions of the European public spheres? Relatedly, how can Europe reverse-engineer the impact of over half a century of market integration on its social texture and culture? And, finally, how likely is it that Europe's diverse citizenry could coagulate into the relatively homogeneous social group whose unity-creating function would then support the structure of supranational public institutions?
These may be political questions, but it would be a mistake to dismiss them as exogenous to a normative inquiry. If the project of European statehood is not viable in any of its imaginable futures, then the very choice between national and supranational statehood that Böckenförde posits turns out not to be much of a choice after all. Indeed, Böckenförde seems altogether too keen to concede that, "if democracy is not to be lost," furtherreaching supranational integration must for now be put "on hold." 17 And putting European integration on hold is itself a political project. "If statehood is to be preserved," he writes, "countermeasures . . . seem imperative, namely in the form of a struggle to reestablish the primacy of politics within a controllable sphere"
18 -the sphere, that is, of the nation state.
The first part of this article examines Böckenförde's account of the nature of European integration, specifically his claim that the disconnection between economic and political integration has led to the fragmentation of concern for the common good. Because the axis of this fragmentation is national-supranational, I refer to this as vertical fragmentation (Part B). In the second half of the article, I ask how this account can apply to instances of horizontal fragmentation underway within member-states whose constitutional structures are coming undone at the hands of freely elected authoritarian populists. In Part C, I argue that, to the extent the European Union can and should protect the rule of law within its 16 BÖCKENFÖRDE, Which Path is Europe Taking?, supra note 1, at 360. 17 Id.
Needless to say, as long as this process of forming a people or a nation of Europeans is under way and still in its infancy, and the 'sense of belonging' is thus still missing with a view to Europe, it is futile to put forth designs and constructions of 'democratic constitution' of Europe; rather, one should put a further-reaching political integration on hold for now. If democracy is not to be lost, that integration can proceed only by 'keeping pace' with a willingness of the people to seek and demand responsibility for the common good not only from the nation state and its government, but also and especially within Europe.
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constitutive states, and thus help to preserve their normative integrity, its role is better understood as one of vertical de-fragmentation of political and constitutional transformations within nation-states.
B. Supranational Integration and Vertical Fragmentation

I. The Age of Inauthenticity
Writing as one of Germany's leading post-war constitutional theorists, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde offers an account of European integration that is characteristically insightful, if somewhat conventional in its main inflections. He portrays integration as a radical project that rejected the logic of organizationally structured cooperation in favor of supranational integration through institutions independent of national governments, endowed with their own sovereign powers and capable of making decisions binding on the member states. 19 No political project of such boldness can become viable unless historical circumstances allow the underlying vision to galvanize into action. Post-war Europe harbored an environment that made the black swan moment possible. Unsurprisingly, the moment was short-lived, and already by the mid-1950s, the resounding defeat of the European Defense Community signaled that member states would use national interest as a Procrustean bed to limit deeper unification. A fundamental shift occurred in European integration at that moment, and thus the age of "inauthenticity" 20 was born.
The defining characteristic of that age, which Böckenförde sees as continuing to this day, is that political unification takes on an exclusive economic-functional cast. While advocates of unification do not relinquish their political goal, their vocabulary and mindset become morphed into a market-centered model. That model had its undeniable successes. 21 But, as Böckenförde points out, their price has been a functional-economic mindset that tilted European integration decisively in the direction of the market. This, in turn, legitimized a politics of expertise that empowered the Brussels bureaucracy without imposing 19 BÖCKENFÖRDE, Which Path is Europe Taking?, supra note 1, at 344. For an early study, and to this day unmatched, of European legal integration, see PIERRE PESCATORE, THE LAW OF INTEGRATION 26 (1974 What is really wanted is a political integration, but officially one has chosen the indirect path via economic integration and is banking on an "inherent constraint" that this integration is supposed to give rise to . . . the architects of Maastricht put the horse before the cart by conceding to monetary fusion precedence over political unification.
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meaningful constrains. It further made it exceedingly difficult even to envision, let alone enact, institutional reforms that could make supranational institutional arrangements more representative, and, through such representative institutions, enable the peoples of Europe to carve out a specific political identity that they could and would share. 22 Instead, the political discourse was straightjacketed, and with few marginal exceptions in the large scheme of European politics, 23 the ever self-calculating political leaders rarely felt comfortable speaking the language of political unification. In retrospect, even the accomplishments of Europe's economic integration seem unsustainable without a radical rearrangement of the background institutional structure. An example as good as any concerns the European Parliament, which, despite the exponential increase in its powers over time, has hardly seen an uptick in its social legitimacy. The explanation, Böckenförde finds, is structural, namely that the Parliament still "cannot represent a people that does not yet exist."
24 "A shared consciousness [must develop] in the sense of a cultural and political identity of the Europeans" that will reveal awareness of their "unity and distinctiveness," 25 yet the political institutions indispensable for its formation could not be brought into existence under the dominance of market forces.
Until, and unless, such developments occur, the corrosive effect of the fragmentation of politics between a supranational market and the domestic governance of welfare states will only deepen. In Böckenförde's account, vertical fragmentation reflects the breakdown of political unity as the inevitable effect of transferring to the European level competencies over economic policy, specifically in the area of the four fundamental freedoms-goods, persons, services and capital-uncoupled from responsibility for social and distributive policies, which remains allocated to the (now incapacitated) Member states. The capitalist industrial society is no longer integrated into the social state, but rather is placed at the supranational level, which, without any regulatory competence of its own in areas such as employment and distributive social policy, emancipates the supranational market from the social market economy. 26 Solidarity cannot be transnationalized without supranational 26 Id. at 351. For a view similar in this respect, see HABERMAS, supra note 9, at 502 (characterizing the present European political sphere as fragmented and discussing the importance and likelihood of creating "an obligation towards the European common good" in order to achieve transnational unification).
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II. Fragmentation Vistas
For a better grasp of the case for fragmentation, let us first turn to one of its main causes:
The transparency costs associated with the coexistence of different levels of government.
27
Part of Böckenförde's concerns about the dual European structure is that multiple levels of government obscure the relations of authority and responsibility for the common good. Because Europe's citizens do not follow the minutiae of the complex allocation of competencies, they mistakenly continue to hold their national governments responsible for the totality of their circumstances. 28 As far as public officials-national or Europeanare concerned, there is no common standpoint from which they can think about their undivided responsibility toward citizens, because these officials inhabit an expanded and compartmentalized political space. The phenomenon of Europeanization fragments the concern for the common good vertically, between the national and supranational levels. This fragmentation has corrosive effects on the unity of statehood. Transparency in the allocation of decision-making is a dimension of the intelligibility of the construction of the public space. It is, in this view, a feature whose absence affects the possibility of political self-government, most immediately at the national level where current political circumstances allow this possibility to actualize.
There is, however, something quite striking about Böckenförde's approach to fragmentation. Too much seems to rests on it. The stakes are oddly eschewed when transparency in the allocation of competencies engages the very possibility of self-government. To be sure, allocative matters are deeply consequential. But the vertical allocation of competencies is a well-known feature of all federal systems. In fact, any state structure, including non-federative ones, that recognizes some degree of decentralization in the allocation of decision-making authority must be able to handle these matters on a routine basis. Perhaps anticipating this objection, Böckenförde points out that his concerns about the allocation of competencies cannot be allayed by "point [ing] 30 And, at this moment in time, "such a political unity is lacking between the EC and the member states."
31
Before getting to the merits of how an economically integrated Europe would be best described politically and constitutionally, it is worth noting how these background assumptions about the nature of European integration inform the approach to fragmentation. The challenges of allocating decision-making between different levels of government are not, in theory, insurmountable. But, according to Böckenförde, the EU at this moment in its historical development is simply not yet the kind of polity to which such known solutions can apply. Were the EU already a polity of that type, disputes over the vertical allocation of competencies between levels of government would not have fragmented the concern for the common good. In such a case, the EU would have been just like any other federal structure, where such disputes routinely arise but, also routinely, are solved by institutions-usually courts-that authoritatively settle disagreements among institutional actors about the internal organization of the state. These institutions exercise a form of hierarchical authority whose integrative dimension reflects and reinforces the overall institutional unity of the state, including, in Böckenförde's parlance, a shared political consciousness of the citizenry.
The claim that the EU lacks the feature of integrative hierarchy seems, at least at first blush, difficult to reconcile with the doctrines of European constitutionalism. More than six decades ago, the European Court of Justice held that the Treaty of Rome created a new legal order that was autonomous from national law, and under which its signatory states limited their sovereign rights. 32 Unlike with international norms, whose implementation into domestic law depends on the mechanisms prescribed by the constitutional rules of 29 BÖCKENFÖRDE, Which Path is Europe Taking?, supra note 1, at 352. 30 Id. 31 
Id.
32 See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1. André Donner, former president of the European Court of Justice, captures this well:
[T]he Treaties themselves and the rapidly growing system of Community regulations are to be considered as rules of law having effect not only between states and the institutions but also between private persons and public authorities, in a way that confers rights and legal claims that should be protected by the courts, then, and only then, will the Communities obtain the solidity necessary to give them the stature of a legal order.
A. M. DONNER, ROLE OF THE LAWYER IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 82 (1968).
412 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 19 No. 02 each system, the decision regarding the effect of European norms in domestic law is centralized in Luxembourg for all the member states. 33 The court held that European legislation automatically becomes part of domestic law upon enactment, or when the term of implementation has expired. 34 What made that a "leap into the unknown," 35 as Pierre Pescatore called it, was not that the European legal system was a system unlike any other, but just the opposite-namely, that its features resembled those of other legal systems. Therein lies the radicalism of the European constitutional project. A sketch of the rest of the normative architecture of European constitutionalism, albeit without coloring nuance, strengthens this case. EU law gives individuals rights that can be enforced in national courts in specific, though broadly construed, circumstances.
36 Furthermore, and importantly, in the event of a conflict, EU law norms prevail by virtue of their pedigree and therefore irrespective of where the domestic norms fit within the hierarchy of domestic norms.
37 National judges are under a duty to give effect to the primacy of EU law by setting aside any norm of national law that violates either a Treaty or legislation of European institutions. 38 In principle, this secondary rule of legal hierarchy applies not only in a clash between national constitutions and the constitutive Treaties, whose texts were signed and ratified by all the member states, but also between the former and ordinary legislation enacted by the European supranational political institutions. 39 National judges have the authority and duty, acting as European courts, 40 to refuse to apply-that is, to "set aside"
41
-national law even in circumstances when they lack such power under national law.
42
These orders, which oftentimes empowered lower national judges, brought clarity and structure to the national judges' obligation of referral, required that courses of action make available effective remedies, demanded specific interpretations of national law, 43 
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duty to treat Community law as law in the same way that national law was law, 44 the duty to make interim relief available, 45 and the duty to guarantee the integrity of the EU process by raising sua sponte questions of European law, 46 among others. Furthermore, because the Treaty constitutes an independent source of law, the European Court centralized the authority to interpret its meaning and to invalidate secondary legislation that violates the Treaty. While the European Court does not decide cases arising under national law, national courts are obligated to apply EU law or to consult the European court whenever its interpretation is in doubt. The Court would later accept the corollary of this approach, namely that Member states can be held liable in tort under EU law for their courts' failure to engage in mandatory consultations through preliminary references to Luxembourg.
47
The rules just described are formal legal doctrines that pertain directly to legal hierarchy and unity. Unconstrained by the demands of democratic legitimation, these doctrines can and, Böckenförde argues, have become tools in the fragmentation of the concern for the common good. The supremacy of EU law gives the commandments of the supranational market the necessary legal force to prevail over national legislation where the competence and responsibility for economic policy, labor market policy, and distributive social policy remain located. 48 At the same time, however, these are constitutional doctrines that pertain to hierarchical unity. And that feature might be particularly relevant here because the cause of inauthenticity in European integration, as Böckenförde constructs it, was the pursuit of a project of political unity in the exclusive guise of economic integration. How, then, do these constitutional doctrines, and the forms of discourse they have engendered, fit in this picture? On the one hand, these doctrines evidently cannot make a claim to the political discourse wholesale. It would take a particular type of dystopian formalist to equate the law in the European books with political reality. On the other hand, these doctrines are not some insignificant leaflet either. They define constitutional structure and are thus arguably a significant part of political discourse that takes place within that structure, including reflexively about possible changes to the structure itself. If an underlying vision of constitutional-political unity remains encased in the doctrines of European constitutionalism, albeit in formal terms, that seems consequential for understanding both the nature of the European Union as it currently exists as well as the option and prospect of European statehood. 44 Case 179/84, Bozzetti v. Invernizzi, 1985 E.C.R. 2301. 45 Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp. ex parte Factortame Ltd., 1990 E.C.R. I-2433. 46 Id. 
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III. Questioning Hierarchy
A seasoned scholar of European integration might find overly simplistic my above recitation of European constitutional doctrine. The mere restatement of the doctrine would be gullible if it endorsed the European Court of Justice's self-interested standpoint, which unsurprisingly portrays the hierarchical relationship between European law and national law as top-down and unidirectional. But that perspective shuns the myriad complexities of how national legal systems have been relating to EU law for over half a century. Under an alternative and supposedly more complex view, when national legal orders have accepted the ECJ's claims to supremacy, they have done so conditionally and subject to a wide range of assumptions that dilute and ultimately undermine the substance of those claims. 49 Specifically, the effect of conditional acceptance has been the creation of a bi-directional-as opposed to top-down, unilateral and federal-like-model of constitutional authority in the Union. In this view, "the [ECJ's] perspective constitutes only one part of the supremacy story. Ultimately, the acceptance and application of the primacy of EU law are dependent on the Member States."
50 Thus, a full and accurate understanding of the legal relation between the EU and its member states requires supplementing the ECJ's perspective on the doctrine of supremacy with the counter-claims of national courts, developed in the process of responding and processing the constitutional claims of the EU. The national perspective is not merely ornamental, but constitutive of the claim to supremacy. Hierarchy in the EU is, thus, "necessarily bidirectional."
51 The nature of the EU supranational order is sui generis and lacks a top-down structure of hierarchical authority.
Note that, from the perspective of vertical fragmentation that Böckenförde theorizes, one effect of conceptualizing supranational integration as compatible with the Westphalian system of nation-state, as this pluralist school of European constitutionalism does, 52 is to protect the space of democratic self-government. When the dictates of the market take the form of European legislation and, through the doctrine of supremacy, seek to trump the social protections that nation-states have in place, constitutional heteronomy enables national legal orders to immunize from supranational interference the democratic choices that people have made within the only political space where processes of collective self-government are as yet available to them. This democracy-protecting implication of the claim from heteronomy is normatively continuous with an approach like Böckenförde's. 
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European supremacy is bi-directional, then national legal orders can calibrate their response to the claims of European constitutionalism in ways that influence the pace and trajectory of European integration. If it turns out that, as Böckenförde argues, the effect of Europeanization in its current institutional form and in confluence with globalization and individuation is to fragment the concern for the common good and undermine the possibility of democratic self-government, then national democracies can protect themselves by recalibrating the process of Europeanization from within, so to speak. The project of salvaging democracy requires that European integration be put on hold, and the conceptual opening that constitutional heteronomy creates provides the space for that holding action.
On a deeper level, however, Böckenförde's approach is incompatible with the pluralist school. That school of constitutional interpretation has welcomed the conceptual opening as the byproduct of the clash between conflicting claims of constitutional authority (national and supranational). Its proponents have theorized the clash as not only the key to understanding the European legal space, but also a feature of constitutionalism more generally. 53 Constitutionalism becomes, in the pluralist approach, a space for negotiation among competing institutional settings as to which of them shows greater fidelity to higher constitutional principles. Institutional claims must be constantly validated; their authority cannot be taken for granted and needs to be justified. 54 No institutional setting can claim a monopoly over those underlying principles, which supersede any predetermined framework, national or supranational. We see how, in this approach, European integration does not threaten nation-states as sites of political and social organization that internalize over time and through supranational socialization, an ethics of mutual accommodation and tolerance. 55 That ethics expresses itself in the coexistence, within the same constitutional space, of competing claims of supremacy.
Böckenförde's constitutional theory is incompatible with the pluralist perspective I have just described. His conceptualization of unitary sovereignty and its connection to the political community's self-sustaining wholeness 56 commit him to the view that bi- 416 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 19 No. 02 directionality is itself a source of fragmentation of constitutional authority and thus a threat to statehood. The institutional unity of the state should reflect the unity of the people; conceptually, it makes any form of breakdown incompatible with the idea of unity. Leaving competing claims of authority unresolved undermines the monopoly of decisionmaking and, with it, the unitary political basis upon which legality itself is premised. While there may be moments in the development of any legal system that might look like expressions of heterarchy, on reflection these moments are fleeting instances of as-yetunresolved structural conflict. Fragmentation and heterarchy cannot become a permanent state without undermining stability and order-that is, without recreating a pre-political space where agents have both an incentive and the opportunity to impose their will to power on others.
Here we see Böckenförde's complex relation to what I have called the bi-directionality theory. On the one hand, bi-directionality opens up the normative European legal space and restores the legitimacy of the national perspective within European constitutionalism.
On the other hand, bi-directionality leads to an ill-advised celebration of the clash among competing claims to authority as the mark of a new model of constitutionalism. Instead, from a Böckenfördian perspective, the coexistence of competing claims is corrosive and must be urgently resolved. A choice between competing claims of authority is thus not only possible but necessary. Böckenförde's own preference, given the weight he ascribes to democratic self-government and his interpretation of the state of European integration, is for the primacy of the nation-state. But, conceptually speaking, any of the two possible choices-that is, for national statehood or for European statehood-would mark a return to hierarchy, structure, and indeed to the unity that, in this view, characterizes constitutionalism properly so called.
Resting the analysis on this point suggests that the very choice between the national and the supranational is a given. It would seem to be a coincidence that Böckenförde's project of salvaging democracy could benefit from the pluralist opening of the normative space within European constitutionalism. The pluralists extoll -mistakenly, in Böckenförde's view-the fragmentation that their opening creates. Rather, that conceptual opening generated by the clash of claims to authority is a problem whose solution must be guided by the imperative of preserving the space for and institutions of collective selfgovernment. But, and this is the critical point, without that opening, the choice between the national and the supranational would not present itself and, without that choice, democratic self-government at the national level would be at the mercy of globalized markets. What, then, created that conceptual opening within the framework of European constitutionalism and made Böckenförde's option for democracy at the national level possible within that framework?
Any possibility of coincidence dissipates when one traces the origins of the choice between the national and the supranational to the counterclaims of constitutional supremacy that national legal orders of the EU member states. It was, of course, the German Constitutional
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Court, prominently among all national apex courts, that conditioned its acceptance of EU supremacy on the protection of fundamental rights at the supranational level. 57 The later and all-important Maastricht decision, where the Karlsruhe Court interpreted the nature of the European legal order in an international key, epitomizes the national counterclaims.
58
In that decision, the German judges interpreted the Treaty of Maastricht as establishing a community of States whose identity ought to be respected and autonomy guaranteed, as is the case in any international organization-"and not with membership in a single
60 States are and-importantly-will remain the main actors in the process of integration-an unsurprising conclusion, given this classic international framework, but a striking one if one reasons from the Maastricht Treaty's reference to the peoples of Europe and the decades-long and consistent jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice that the European legal order is autonomous and different in nature from international law. The holding that German law retained jurisdiction over EU legislation that was enacted ultra vires follows directly from that framework that demanded the continuity of the German state and its own processes of self-government.
61 57 Yet, the Solange challenge was not as far-reaching as many scholars have portrayed, since the German judges accepted some core building blocks of European constitutionalism, including the claim that the constitutive Treaty is an independent source of law, that it has created its own legal order, and that the European legal order was autonomous from domestic law. The Maastricht Treaty constitutes an agreement under international law establishing a compound of States of the Member States which is oriented towards further development. The inter-governmental community is dependent upon the Treaty continually being revitalized by the Member States; the fulfillment and development of the Treaty must ensure from the will of the contracting parties. 59 Id. at 16. 60 Id. at 21. Christian Calliess refers to this approach, which the German Constitutional Court will continue to pursue in its Lisbon judgment, as "almost tragic" because, in taking the international law perspective, "the Court is adopting a restrictive democratic approach towards the very organization which-contrary to classic institutional organizations like the UN and the WTO-actually has a parliament that is directly elected by its citizens and has far-reaching decision-making and control powers. It does not take long to note the overlap of core aspects of Böckenförde's approach to European integration with the constitutional vision that underpins the Maastricht decision, in which he sat as a member of the Court. When asking what "a democratic structure of the European Community would look like," he argues that it is not a matter of transferring "concrete historical manifestations" from the national to the supranational level; rather, democracy "has to be thought anew with a thought toward the special conditions under which authority is grounded and exercised at the international level." 62 The reference to the international level here is less important than the reference to the specifically European level, though the former indicates the underlying vision. I believe Böckenförde's view of the special conditions of the European project is more significant. "One can get close to them," he argues, "if one recognizes that the European Union, also on the level of integration of the EC, is a community of nations and nation states."
63 A commitment to respect the identity of its member states is one of the implications that follow from that view of the nature of the European Union.
I return to the issue of identity below. 64 Noteworthy for now is Böckenförde's interpretation of the nature of the European Union through an internationalist lens as a union of nations and, especially, nation-states-much like an international organization. That interpretation implicitly rejects the established jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, which, as presented above, consistently rejected that interpretation of the nature of the Treaties. Now, it is perhaps possible to argue that Böckenförde subsumes the co-existence of the national and supranational levels, from a normative standpoint, to the central normative issue of democratic legitimacy. Still, this would be a strikingly depoliticized and unrecognizable interpretation of European integration, whose development over time has been nothing if not a constant battle between political forces, including constitutional or apex courts, some of which pushed for greater supranational integration and others opposed it and correspondingly sought to keep nation-states in a position of control. 65 Assessed against the background of that protracted political battle, Böckenförde's interpretation of the European Union as an international organization takes sides in this debate and is far from being a neutral or scientific description. This vindicates, individual states would be weakened to such an extent that the parliaments of the Member States would no longer be able to convey adequately that legitimation of the sovereign powers exercised by the Union. 62 BÖCKENFÖRDE, Which Path is Europe Taking?, supra note 1, at 358. 63 
Id.
64 See Infra Part C.IV. 
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I believe, Ronald Dworkin's adamant plea that, in law, one searches in vain for an Archimedean standpoint from which to describe something without at the same time also engaging in a process of interpretation. Through interpretation, one is taking sides in normative debates, whether one is willing to acknowledge it or not. 66 "Descriptions" of the nature of the European Union are no exception.
C. Horizontal Fragmentation and Vertical De-Fragmentation
In this Part, I aim to put Böckenförde's conception of European integration to the test by assessing it against political developments that he could not have addressed directly 67 -namely the normative transformations within nation-states that, after acceding to the EU, have rolled back the institutional structures of constitutional democracy. This authoritarian backsliding adds important complexity to European integration. 68 As presented above, Böckenförde sees the European supranational level primarily as the place from where market forces are unleashed upon the national welfare states and proceed to creatively destroy the underlying social bond. Yet recent developments, principally-though not exclusively 69 -in Eastern Europe, suggest the need for a more comprehensive framework not only for what the EU could or should become, but also of what the EU already is. They suggest that, rather than being the source of vertical fragmentation, the EU's role in this existential crisis can be one of vertical defragmentation of normative transformations within nation-states. I use defragmentation here in its usual meaning in computer science as the method for restoring unity or integrity of a hard drive. Position 1 (horizontal fragmentation) represents typical instances of differences in the interpretation and application of EU law across national jurisdictions leading to the fragmentation of the European legal space. Either benign differences in the use of common concepts-"goods," "worker," "disability," etc.-or, less benignly, failures to implement EU directives or national violations of EU law, are all sources of horizontal fragmentation. As the authoritative interpreter of the Treaty, the ECJ has monopolized the meaning of fundamental EU concepts and invoked the imperative of securing the effectiveness of EU law to reduce horizontal fragmentation. The causes of this type of fragmentation have also led to fragmentation of other types, namely political and ideological battles for the most part, or differences among constitutional traditions on occasion. The discourse of fragmentation itself has been political and, as I argue below, connected to a particular understanding of the demands of the market. Position 2 (vertical fragmentation) represents Böckenförde's theorizing of the role-as opposed to the discourse-of the EU vis-à-vis member states in position number 2, through the fragmentation of the supranational market and national social distributive policies. The authoritarian backsliding, however, puts the EU in the different position of seeking to restore normative integrity within member states. That role (position 4) is one of vertical de-fragmentation, that is, of restoring unity within the normative software at the national and, indirectly, supranational levels.
I. Authoritarian Backsliding
The details of the authoritarian backsliding in countries such as Hungary and Poland are sufficiently well documented, and they do not need to be recounted here at length. 70 In brief, despite hopes that European integration would keep the authoritarian demons at bay, 71 these demons are making a forceful comeback in countries where governments elected to office in free and at least moderately fair elections have put tremendous pressure on the institutional structures of their fledgling constitutional democracies with a goal toward neutralizing political resistance and gaining lasting and effective control over 
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the state. Their recognizable, age-old goal is to amass power and protect it from the mechanisms that, in a constitutional democracy, limit both its reach and consolidation in time. As a result, independent institutions-the judiciary as well as independent agencies-such as those overseeing the media, or even universities, have come under crushing political pressure. Important battles have been fought over constitutional amendments, electoral laws, lawmaking procedures, and changes to media protections. The scale of these political projects, the pace at which they unfold, and the complex ways in which they undermine existing constitutional arrangements from within pose important theoretical challenges to constitutional and political theory. The risk that other statesRomania being a perpetual candidate, Bulgaria farther along down this path than it is generally recognized, the Czech Republic and Slovakia with all the stars aligned for the backsliding to commence, focusing solely on the central and eastern flank of the EU-are one election cycle away, and sometimes less, from empowering populist forces with such a constitutional agenda makes these challenges urgent.
The fact that a constitutional democracy-especially one of recent pedigree such as the countries of Central and Eastern Europe-might experience authoritarian backsliding, is by itself unsurprising. There is no "absolute security," Böckenförde wrote, "against the threat to freedom that results from human coexistence." 72 For this reason, the institutions of constitutional democracies need to continuously ensure that the state's authority is exercised not arbitrarily but according to the state's fundamental purposes and "subject to regular processes as well as accountability and oversight."
73 But when such developments do occur, they generate what one could call the horizontal fragmentation of the concern for the common good. In the particular case of the populist surge in Europe, authoritarian backsliding has involved the use of religion in a sectarian manner and the willful misrepresentation of a nation's history in order to artificially realign social coherence with political self-interest. This manufactured homogeneity has threatened liberty and the political-liberal character of the state and the basis of its social unity. 74 As state policy, these political developments have eroded the values of pluralism and (relative) heterogeneity that, as Böckenförde argues, constitute the fundamentals of the liberal order. 
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By introducing authoritarian backsliding in a way disconnected from the fragmentation that Böckenförde sees at the center of the relation between the supranational level and the nation-state, I seem to imply a sharp distinction between horizontal and vertical fragmentation. But perhaps one could argue, and some have indeed gestured in that direction, 76 that backsliding is inherently related to vertical fragmentation in precisely Böckenförde's sense. A strong version of this thesis sees the vertical fragmentation of the concern for the common good as one of the causes of the authoritarian backsliding that results in horizontal fragmentation. This might seem like a remote possibility given the relatively short time between EU accession, and the onset of the backsliding suggests that there has not been sufficient time for the fragmentation-as Böckenförde theorizes it-to take hold. But counting from the moment of accession might be unwarranted. It is worth recalling that, long before these states joined the EU, they had been under Brussels's command as to the structure of their economies. The implementation into their legal system of a massive acquis communautaire, and generally under oversight that left little to chance-or, for that matter, to their self-governing citizens-when it came to the organization of the state and the institutions of society. This degree of supranational command, according to this thesis, has kept democratic states weak by discouraging mechanisms of democratic responsiveness and instead leaving the collective future of selfgoverning people in the hands of elites who stood to benefit from implementing market commandments dictated by supranational institutions.
To evaluate this thesis, I note first that, given the extent of integration in Europe, the very distinction between national and supranational has taken on a new and diluted meaning. More specifically in the case at hand, EU membership has indeed enabled some of the proto-authoritarian governments to use reliable EU funds to mitigate the economic blow of their partisan domestic policies. But this is a far cry from placing supranational membership among the causes of the authoritarian policies. Before delving too deeply into historical counterfactuals, it remains unclear whether backsliding would not have happened-and perhaps a lot sooner-had it not been for the EU's role and influence. 77 The argument that the policies of austerity dictated from the EU have set in motion the authoritarian backsliding requires careful scrutiny. On one level, it is true that austerity measures have generated political upheaval at the national level. But that upheaval did not take an authoritarian cast in countries that were most affected-Greece and Ireland 
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among them-though it thus far did in countries were the impact has been felt but was not significant (Hungary and Poland). Political scientists and theorists are at the early stages of processing these developments, and careful studies will likely unearth a complex dynamic instead of the unidirectional causality that underpins the strong thesis between vertical and horizontal fragmentation.
Note also that when the EU has been criticized for its role in the backsliding, it has typically been for its failure to uphold the rule of law more quickly and effectively. To give just one example, in over seven years of the systematic overhaul of the Hungarian state, the only definitive violation of European law has been found to be the forced retirement of the judges on the Hungarian Constitutional Court-an obvious political measure that was meant to allow the ruling party to capture the Court and that violated the EU prohibition of discrimination on the basis of age. 78 Even then, the ECJ's decision came too late for the forcibly-retired judges to be reinstated. 79 Perhaps this is an example of inauthenticity. Yet, that would bracket the European Commission's vocal advocacy against backsliding, although the Commission did not-until recently, and even then, haltingly 80 -use some of its most effective political and institutional means of intervention against Hungary.
Rather than pointing to some ideological affinity between the supranational institutions and national autocrats, understanding the EU's limited intervention requires asking what action can be taken and how to justify any such action. The reasons for the EU institutions' reluctance include the complex political situation-for instance, Hungary's votes within the EPP. But the availability and legitimacy of tools for intervention is equally if not more important in this context. Unlike previous constitutive Treaties, Lisbon does give doctrinal form to these commitments to freedom, the rule of law, solidarity, tolerance, and justice.
81
It also provides tools to use in situations where states violate their commitments, although these tools are almost exclusively political and thus subject to the overall political dynamic. The European Commission has developed mechanisms, such as the Rule-of-Law- The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.
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Framework, to bring disobedient states into compliance. 82 These special mechanisms coexist alongside generally available tools, such as infringement actions through which the Commission, 83 acting sua sponte or pursuant to third party notifications, initiates political and possibly legal action against a member state alleged to have violated a Treaty obligation. But an unsettled core question concerns the normative basis for the EU's intervention in the constitutional affairs of its member states. What entitles the EU to apply political or legal pressure on its member states whose duly elected representatives have chosen to enact legislation that, in their judgment, falls within the mandate for which the self-governing citizens have elected them into office? This vertical de-fragmentation raises core questions about how to conceptualize the normative interface between the national and supranational legal orders in the EU.
II. Values and Self-Government
I turn now to the question of what the EU can do about horizontal fragmentation and the legitimacy of its acts. On one level, the answer to the basis of the EU's intervention in domestic constitutional and political developments might seem deceptively straightforward. Article 2 TEU lists a set of values (including freedom, the rule of law, solidarity, tolerance, and justice) that all state members of the European Union must respect. At first blush, enforcement of the commitment to these values provides sufficient ground for supranational intervention. Yet, Böckenförde's work cautions against placing such weight on values.
Böckenförde draws a distinction between values as the foundation of a legal order-which he rejects-and values as part of the legal order-which he accepts. 84 The argument against using values to legitimize the foundation and the formative power of the law has three prongs. First, Böckenförde argues that while values can ground individual conduct within a legal order, they are ill-suited to ground the order itself because they rely on receding rational argumentation in the face of experience, emotion, and contemplation. Second, value-based grounding of law invites relativism and is ultimately irrational because issues such as ranking of (conflicting) values are a priori of the ethical world and therefore cannot provide the kind of foundation that the pacifying function of a legal system requires-namely universal validity, rational accessibility, and the fundamental possibility of rational communication. 85 Finally, and despite appearances to the contrary, reflection on values in the lifeworld is bound entirely to historical-cultural moments. This has the perverse effect of offering a "semblance of grounding"
86 that mistakenly renders the search for alternative grounds superfluous while at the same time "opening the floodgates" to the subjective views of legal actors about the interpretation and ranking of values. This interpretative process confers an aura of legitimacy to prevailing societal values which is indefensible in a pluralist society. 
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Böckenförde's constitutional theory suggests a plain and unsurprising answer to the first question. Given its current state of development, and specifically its failure to establish processes of democratic legitimation, the EU must defer to the member states. But does the reasoning behind the imperative of deference-democratic self-government-apply even when states have taken an authoritarian turn, and when that turn is seen as affirming the nation's project of self-government? In the Eastern European examples, the political majorities that carried out the transformative political and constitutional project have been voted into office in regularly held elections whose fairness has not been seriously contested. In Hungary, the Fidesz majority has also been returned into office even after the scale of the political project became apparent. Thus, if deference entails respect for a political community that governs itself through the institutions of a nation-state to define, though its internal processes, the implications of its commitment to abstract values in its own cultural context and specific historical moment, and if that meaning must remain open to revision as state institutions fulfill their duties of responsiveness vis-a-vis their citizenry, then the constitutional moment in Hungary and Poland deserves respect as an instance of political self-government.
The gravitational pull of the Böckenfördian idea of the state undercuts the possibility of a European standpoint from which to consider the internal disintegration of the common good. If the deference is owed to nation-states, then the values listed in Art. 2 are an instance of "bad abstraction" 88 that should not enable the European Union to undermine the freedom of self-governing political communities to define and live by the constitutional commitments they make to themselves. The European legal space must remain discontinuous in the sense that self-government requires that domestic jurisdictions ought to remain able to protect their autonomy and mechanisms of meaning-creation though a residual capacity of normative closure vis-a-vis the supranational legal order. The downside, however, is that the capacity for normative closure also immunizes the authoritarian turn.
III. The Search for Neutral Principles
Assuming arguendo that Böckenförde's critique of values is sound and that grounding law on values inevitably leads to interpretative conflicts, the solution to these conflicts is interpretative deference. As we have seen, that deference itself is not grounded in values but in respect for self-determination of the kind that-in Böckenförde's account and considering the current state of European integration-is currently possible only at the national level. But consider again the question as it presents itself in the context of a member state of the European Union that has adopted measures that undermine the equal standing of its citizens and threaten the social bond. Suppose further that whatever
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domestic safeguards the domestic constitutional order might have had in place could not be effectively deployed against these measures. Are there any limits to the degree of deference to which nation-states are entitled from the European Union?
Any such limits would have to place the EU's authority to intervene on neutral grounds, that is on grounds whose legitimacy member states cannot reasonably reject. 89 States cannot reject intervention on grounds that unquestionably demonstrate respect for EU institutions for domestic processes of self-government. For instance, justifying EU intervention on specific interpretations about the meaning of a value is not a neutral ground, because member states are entitled to deference with regard to the interpretation of those values. This poses a challenge because, as Böckenförde correctly sees, virtually all legal problems have a value dimension which can be specified and made the object of interpretative disagreement. The only solution to this conundrum is to identify situations when meaning has been already settled at the national level but the state has acted in violation of its own interpretative processes, either in specific cases, or by undermining institutions such as courts that play a central role in those processes.
This, I believe, describes quite accurately the pattern of the EU's intervention in Romania in 2012 and currently in Poland. In both cases, political branches failed to comply with the constitutional court's authoritative interpretation of the meaning of the constitution and sought to limit the independence and authority of the judicial system that produced that authoritative interpretation. Political majorities tried to avoid the effect of the decisions of the Constitutional Court by prohibiting their timely publication in the official state journal. In Romania, the executive openly threatened to disobey unfavorable decisions that derailed its attempt to unseat the President. 90 In Poland, the majority sought to pack the constitutional court with loyal judges. In both countries, the political majority moved to drastically limit the jurisdiction of the constitutional court though legislation that the court itself later struck down as unconstitutional. Attacks on the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary provided the "neutral principles" on which EU institutions could base their intervention. In Romania's case, the existence of a Mechanism of Cooperation and Verification set in place at the time of the country's accession to the EU in 2007 provided the structure for the formal intervention as well as the framework for exerting informal pressure. Without such a mechanism, the response in Poland's case has been the Rule-of-Law framework that the European Commission had created recently. 
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By contrast, the Hungarian experience did not afford comparable neutral grounds on which European institutions could intervene. The reason was not that the Fidesz government left the Constitutional Court alone. On the contrary, the government packed the Court with supportive judges, forced the unfriendly ones to retire, and altered the Court's jurisdiction-all part of a successful effort to neutralize the Court. But the difference was that some of these and many other measures were introduced by way of constitutional amendment. A solid parliamentary majority allowed Fidesz to amend the constitution and eventually replace it with a new constitution, which in turn was later amended. European officials criticized Hungary's constitutional effervescence but, at least according to this normative reconstruction, lacked the grounds from which to take measures comparable to those the EU would later adopt against Poland or Romania.
92
So, it seems that this neutral ground fits and justifies the pattern of the EU's intervention in the context of an authoritarian turn at the national level. And yet, this account is in tension with other parts of Böckenförde's constitutional theory. The relevant distinction in the EU's pattern of intervention tracks not the severity of the measures that undermine the unity of the state, as much as it is connected to contingent criteria such as the size of a parliamentary majority or the specific constitutional amendment procedures. The Hungarian constitution is much easier to amend than the Romanian constitution, which calls for a referendum, and comparatively easier than the Polish constitution. 93 The election returns gave Fidesz a super-majority in Parliament, which it exploited with dizzying effectiveness. But ascribing theoretical relevance to that fact and to these distinctions places the state under the constitution, a view that Böckenförde has opposed. Perhaps, however, Böckenförde's theories can be used to show that Hungary's constitutional transformations reveal Fidesz's effectiveness in undermining the ethical state and ought not to be recognized as the ground for treating Hungary more-rather than less-leniently. The difficulty here is that Böckenförde's theory removes any standpoint from which to make this argument. Our question is whether the European Union can legitimately intervene from the supranational level when domestic safeguards have failed to bar or contain an authoritarian turn. A legitimate intervention marks a limitation of the deference to which nation-states are entitled. Yet, if anything, a wholesale constitutional transformation such as Hungary's heightens the deference to which, according to Böckenförde, a political community is entitled in the immediate aftermath of engaging in constitution-making, one of the most consequential exercises of selfgovernment. 92 One exception is the judgment on the retirement of judges. See Case C-286/12. Comm'n v. Hungary, 2012 E.C.R. 687. 93 Under the new, 2013 Hungarian constitution, the procedure is laid down in Article S. See Tekst Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej ogłoszono w Dz.U. 1997, NR 78 poz. 483, art. 235; art. 151, Const. Ro., para. 3.
